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PERSUADING WITH PRECEDENT:  
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING ANALOGIES  
IN LEGAL ARGUMENT 
JACOB M. CARPENTER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When writing persuasive briefs, attorneys use comparisons—metaphors 
or case-based analogies—to help explain their analyses and support their 
positions.1  Cognitive science shows that readers process information both 
by metaphor and by analogy in much the same way.2  But attorneys use the 
two types of comparisons for very different purposes.3  Metaphors 
occasionally can be helpful in certain briefs, but case-based analogies are 
critical in most briefs4 because of the American legal system’s reliance on 
precedent and stare decisis.5 
Several legal scholars have explored how attorneys use metaphors in 
their legal writing.6  Although the existing scholarship on legal metaphors is 
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1 GEORGETOWN UNIV. WRITING CTR., WHAT DO YOU MEAN “THERE’S MORE THAN ONE 
WAY TO DO IT”? SELECTING METHODS OF LEGAL ANALYSIS THAT WORK BEST 1 (2004), 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/legal-writing-
scholarship/writing-center/upload/legalanalysismethods.pdf. 
2 See MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN 
PERSUASIVE WRITING 199 (2d ed. 2008) (quoting EDWARD P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. 
CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 396 (4th ed. 1999)). 
3 See id. at 206–18; Dan Hunter, Teaching and Using Analogy in Law, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL 
WRITING DIRECTORS 151, 155 (2004). 
4 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 152–53.  
5 Stare decisis is defined as “[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow 
earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.”  Stare Decisis, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 571, 572 (1987) (“Reliance on precedent is part of life in general.”). 
6 In fact, Professor Michael R. Smith began a 2007 article by stating, “The role of 
metaphor in the law has been a hot topic among legal scholars in recent years.”  Michael R. 
Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58 MERCER L. REV. 919, 919 (2007).   
462 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [44:461 
 
excellent, it is not sufficient to properly understand how to best draft case-
based analogies.  Unfortunately, legal analogies have been surprisingly 
understudied despite their critical role in persuasive legal briefs.  Not 
surprisingly, many attorneys are unaware of how far short their analogies 
fall from reaching their persuasive potential.7   
Cass Sunstein explored the role analogies play in legal reasoning.8    He 
focused on the role of analogies in shaping the law and developing legal 
principles, and he compared analogical reasoning to other forms of 
reasoning, such as economic analysis of law.9  He did not examine analogies 
from a cognitive science perspective, nor did he examine practicing 
attorneys’ use of analogies in brief writing.10   
A decade later, professor of legal studies Dan Hunter and professor of 
psychology Barbara Spellman each examined legal analogies in their 
respective articles.11  Professor Hunter’s and Professor Spellman’s articles 
considered analogies in terms of cognitive science and what may make one 
analogy more effective than another.12  These articles reached some 
interesting conclusions and are an excellent starting point to advance this 
topic.  However, it has now been over a decade since those articles were 
published, and in-depth examination of legal analogies, especially based on 
substantive and doctrinal underpinnings, have not been continued.  This 
Article seeks to change that, to restart the conversation, and to advance the 
analysis in more depth, especially focusing on applying the information 
learned in other disciplines to legal writing in practical and concrete ways.    
Although legal scholars have not sufficiently studied analogies in 
persuasive briefs, scientists have extensively studied analogies in non-legal 
contexts.13  This Article explores what studies in other disciplines can teach 
legal minds about how judges and attorneys process analogies, connecting 
existing science in concrete ways to the legal context of brief writing.  Part 
II provides cognitive scientists’ descriptions of how people learn through 
analogies.  Learning about these concepts allows attorneys to understand 
                                                                                                                          
7 See David L. Lee, Analogizing Your Case to a Precedent, L. OFFS. DAVID L. LEE (2016), 
http://www.davidleelaw.com/articles/caselawana.html. 
8 See Cass Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 742 (1993). 
9 Id.   
10 See generally id.   
11 See generally Hunter, supra note 3; Barbara Spellman, Judges, Expertise, and Analogy, 
in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 
2010).   
12 Hunter, supra note 3, at 152; Spellman, supra note 11, at 1189. 
13 Donald R. Kretz & Daniel C. Krawczyk, Expert Analogy Use in a Naturalistic Setting, 
5 FRONT. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2014). 
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how a reader’s brain processes analogical information.  After explaining 
how information provided through metaphors and analogies is processed 
similarly, this Article focuses on the differences between metaphors and 
analogies in legal writing.  Understanding the differences will allow 
attorneys to think more strategically about what they want to accomplish 
when employing a metaphor or an analogy.     
After discussing the differences between metaphors and analogies, the 
remainder of the Article focuses on case-based analogies.  Part III discusses 
studies conducted by scholars in other disciplines that focus on what people 
perceive when provided with an analogy.  Following the description of each 
study, this Article connects the theory, studies, and conclusions about 
analogies to the realm of legal analysis, reasoning, and persuasion.14  This 
information will allow attorneys to get the maximum effect out of their 
analogies to help the reader see the analogical strength in the same way that 
the writer, who is much more familiar with the precedent, perceives it.   
Finally, Part IV provides several examples of effective and ineffective 
case-based analogies based on the insight explained in Part III.  By exploring 
the results and conclusions from the experiments in other disciplines and 
applying it to the realm of legal analysis, this Article explores how attorneys 
can become more conscious of their approach to crafting analogies.  As a 
result, attorneys can greatly improve their skills as brief writers and 
advocates.   
II. UNDERSTANDING ANALOGIES AND METAPHORS THROUGH 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE  
Trial and appellate briefs routinely involve facts that fall into gray areas 
of the law.  When this occurs, attorneys often use comparisons as the main 
tool to persuade judges to rule in their clients’ favor.15  These comparisons 
consist primarily of either metaphors or case-based analogies.16  First, by 
examining cognitive science, this Part explains how humans process 
information presented in metaphorical and analogical formats.  Second, this 
Part explains the different uses of metaphors compared to case-based 
analogies in briefs.  Thus, this Part demonstrates that although metaphors 
and analogies are two tools attorneys use in their briefs to help explain 
                                                                                                                          
14 See infra text accompanying note 187–203.   
15 Gerald Lebovits, Persuading the Judge Through Writing: How to Win, NYSBA J., Feb. 
2009, at 64, 57, http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=55008. 
16 See Ken Lopez, List of Analogies, Metaphors and Idioms for Lawyers, A2L 
CONSULTING (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.a2lc.com/blog/bid/54079/Lists-of-Analogies-
Metaphors-and-Idioms-for-Lawyers. 
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concepts and educate readers, they play significantly different roles in briefs.  
What makes a metaphor effective in a brief is very different from what 
makes an analogy effective.  These differences help demonstrate why case-
based analogies must be studied as carefully as metaphors have been.         
A. The Cognitive Scientist’s Explanation of How Humans Process 
Information Provided as a Metaphor or Analogy 
A metaphor is “an implied comparison between two things of unlike 
nature that yet have something in common.”17  An analogy is “a non-
identical or non-literal similarity comparison between two things, with a 
resulting predictive or explanatory effect.”18  Through the cognitive science 
lens, metaphors and analogies are largely alike.  They both involve 
comparing a new, abstract concept to an old, understood concept to help the 
reader understand the new concept in a certain way—the way in which the 
attorney wants the judge to understand it.19  Cognitive scientists state that 
comparisons are the “primary vehicle of cognition”: the unknown, the new, 
the unclear, and the remote are understood by one’s perception of the 
familiar.20  As Professor Linda Berger wrote, “When we consciously use 
metaphor[s] . . . , we provide concrete images that make it easier to think 
about and manage abstract or unfamiliar concepts.”21  This understanding, 
studied extensively by modern cognitive scientists, was noted over two 
thousand years ago when Aristotle proclaimed that analogies “give names to 
nameless things.”22  
When an attorney drafts a metaphor, the “concrete image” is a concept 
that is familiar to the judge (such as a highway system), and the “abstract or 
unfamiliar concept” is something about which the judge may not be 
knowledgeable (such as how the internet works).23  When an attorney drafts 
                                                                                                                          
17 SMITH, supra note 2, at 199. 
18 Hunter, supra note 3, at 152.  
19 See id.; SMITH, supra note 2, at 199. 
20 See Stephanie A. Gore, “A Rose By Any Other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors for 
New Technologies, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 403, 411 (2003). 
21 Linda L. Berger, The Lady, or the Tiger? A Field Guide to Metaphor and Narrative, 
50 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 278–79 (2011). 
22 SMITH, supra note 2, at 199 (citing LANE COOPER, THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE 188 
(1932)). 
23 Gore, supra note 20, at 425.  The prevalence of metaphors to help explain computers 
and the internet will be discussed in more length later in this section.  See infra notes 57–63 
and accompanying text. 
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a case-based analogy, the concrete image is a precedent case, and the 
“unfamiliar concept” is the undecided present case before the judge.   
Comparing a new, unclear, legal concept to a familiar, concrete, non-
legal concept to help the judge understand the legal concept in a particular 
way (via metaphor)—or comparing the present case to a precedent case to 
“educate” the judge that a particular outcome is appropriate (via analogy)—
is effective because humans go through daily life gaining knowledge just 
this way.24  Humans understand new concepts by comparing them to 
already-established concepts, an idea that is “deeply embedded in our 
consciousness.”25  This is called “analogical transfer.”26  In fact, 
“[a]nalogical reasoning . . . is a fundamental aspect of human cognition. . . . It 
is a core process in . . . problem-solving . . . and decision-making.”27   
As explained by cognitive scientists, humans “make sense out of new 
experiences by placing them into categories and cognitive frames called 
schema or scripts that emerge from prior experience.”28  A schema is an 
image that a person can easily visualize.29  A script is event or sequence of 
events with which a person is familiar (e.g., when a person thinks of going 
to a restaurant, that person would expect a particular sequence of events to 
occur: to be seated, to be approached by a waiter, etc.).30  When providing a 
metaphor or an analogy, two domains are established: a source and a target.31  
The source is the schema or script.32  In other words, the source is the 
concrete image or the prior, familiar concept the judge understands from past 
experience.33  The target is the “abstract or unfamiliar concept”—the new 
legal concept the judge must learn and apply, or the new case the judge must 
decide.34   
                                                                                                                          
24 See Berger, supra note 21, at 279–80. 
25 Id. at 279. 
26 Spellman, supra note 11, at 150 (describing the process of “taking a situation that is 
well understood . . . and using it to help explicate a situation that is less well understood . . . .”). 
27 D. Gentner & L. Smith, Analogical Reasoning, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
130 (V.S. Ramachandran ed., 2d ed. 2012), http://groups.psych.northwestern.edu/gentner 
/papers/gentnerSmith_2012.pdf. 
28 Berger, supra note 21, at 280. 
29 See id. at 290. 
30 See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge 
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1138–39 (2004). 
31 Berger, supra note 21, at 278. 
32 See id. at 280. 
33 See id. at 278–80. 
34 See id. at 278–79 (the “reader” or “audience” is often the judge). 
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If the metaphor or analogy is effective, the source will have features that 
the judge understands and that the judge will apply to the target, helping the 
judge understand the target.35  Drafting an effective analogy or metaphor is 
difficult because although the source has features the attorney wants the 
judge to apply to the target, the source typically has additional features that 
the attorney does not want the judge to attribute to the target.36  
Analogical transfers involve the following two steps:37 retrieval and 
mapping.38  In retrieval, the attorney must find and provide the judge with a 
proper source domain.39  Thus, the attorney must choose an effective 
concrete image (for a metaphor) or precedent case (for an analogy) that the 
judge understands.40  Then, for the comparison to be effective, mapping must 
occur.41  Mapping is the process of connecting the features from the source 
to the target.42  In simple terms, it means the judge “makes the connection” 
between the source and the target.  When these two steps occur, the target, 
which began as an unfamiliar and abstract concept, now makes sense to the 
judge.43 
Two types of features can be retrieved and mapped from the source to 
the target.44  One type is called the “surface features” (or “superficial 
                                                                                                                          
35 See id. at 279.  
36 See, e.g., Gore, supra note 20, at 448–54 (providing two examples of metaphors 
criticized as wrong by the courts).  
37 As psychology professor Barbara Spellman points out, analogical reasoning can also 
be broken down into three, four, or five steps.  See Barbara Spellman, Reflections of a 
Recovering Lawyer: How Becoming a Cognitive Psychologist—and (In Particular) Studying 
Analogical and Causal Reasoning—Changed My Views About the Field of Psychology and 
Law, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1187, 1192 n.16 (2004).  Some scholars point to other steps, 
including “creating a mental representation of the source analog[ue],” extending knowledge 
about the source to “construct inferences about the target,” and “generalizing two or more 
analog[ue]s to form an abstract schema.”  Id. at 1192 n.16, 1193.  This Article focuses on the 
steps of retrieval and mapping, at times collapsing the steps of mapping and extending into 
one, as in accord with some of the literature. 
38 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 150. 
39 See id. 
40 See, e.g., id. (using three previous cases as sources to recall memory and provide 
images of the abstract concept). 
41 See id. at 150–51 (mapping corresponds elements of the source to the target to draw 
the connection). 
42 See id. at 150. 
43 See Berger, supra note 21, at 278–79.  
44 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 151. 
2016] PERSUADING WITH PRECEDENT 467 
 
features” or “attributes”).45  The surface features are the features that are 
often tangible or visible.46  In a legal, case-based analogy, the surface 
features are the facts from the precedent case (i.e., the source) and the similar 
facts in the present case (i.e., the target).47   
The second type is called “relational features.”48  Relational features 
often are not as obvious as surface features.  They are beneath the surface 
and “must often be inferred,”49 and they link the source and the target in 
ways more important than the superficial similarities.50  In a case-based 
analogy, the relational features may be the effect that the facts have on the 
parties or on the law.51  For example, an analogy may be strong—even if the 
facts do not seem similar—if both sets of facts could cause similar harm to 
the public, or if both sets of facts would further the same purpose underlying 
the applicable statute.52   
Both types of features are important.  Surface similarities often play a 
more important role in retrieval (in the audience remembering the source), 
while relational similarities play a more important role in mapping (in 
connecting features from the source to the target, and thus in convincing the 
audience that the target is similar to the source in important ways).53 
Learning, processing information, and simply viewing the world are 
often based on comparisons.54  It is inherent in how we think: “[H]uman 
cognition is essentially metaphorical.”55  For example,56 people associate the 
concept of “up” with being alive, conscious, healthy, happy, and in control.  
We “wake up,” our “spirits are high,” we listen to “uplifting music,” we want 
to be in “top shape,” and we want to have control “over a situation” or “rise 
above” a negative situation.  Similarly, we associate the concept of “down” 
with being dead, unconscious, sad, or controlled by others.  For example, we 
may feel “down in the dumps” and “depressed.”  Our spirits may “sink.”  
                                                                                                                          
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See id. at 150. 
48 Id. at 151. 
49 Id. 
50 See id. at 151–52. 
51 See id. at 152. 
52 See id. 
53 Id. at 151. 
54 See Gore, supra note 20, at 404. 
55 Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A Substantive Critique of Baseball Metaphors in 
Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17, 20 n.8 (1994). 
56 Many of the following examples are found in SMITH, supra note 2, at 217. 
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When we get sick, we “fall ill” or “come down with the flu.”  A person may 
“fall from power.”  A person may be “under pressure.”  We use these 
expressions all the time without thinking about their meaning, yet they are 
all metaphorical.  We are not literally falling, but that familiar concept helps 
us quickly and easily understand the concept of going from a position of 
health to sickness, or of being in power to being controlled by others.    
Another excellent example of analogical transfer in metaphor form can 
be found in attempts over the past few decades to understand computers and 
the internet.57  First, consider how people use the internet.  They connect to 
the “information superhighway”58 and “surf the net.”59  While on the 
internet, users visit web “pages.”60  If they find a website they like, they may 
set a “bookmark.”61  In addition, they may enter into a “chatroom.”62  All the 
while, they hope not to encounter any “viruses,” “worms,” or “Trojans.”63  
These are all metaphors.  No one literally uses a highway, but the metaphor 
helps conceptualize the once-abstract notion of the internet.  No one places 
an actual bookmark on a web “page,” but this metaphor is a shorthanded 
way to visualize the concept of setting a quick reference point from which 
you may revisit a place on the internet.  And computers are not “infected” 
by living “viruses” or “worms,” but the metaphor allows comprehension of 
the concept of a computer being harmed by computer code that, without the 
analogy, may be too technical to understand. 
In a legal context, courts have also relied on metaphors to help grasp and 
discuss concepts regarding computers and the internet.  For example, courts 
have compared the internet to a phone,64 a newspaper,65 a thriving city,66 and 
a set of encyclopedias.67  One court stated that the internet is “‘[l]ike 
                                                                                                                          
57 See Gore, supra note 20, at 425. 
58 See id. at 426. 
59 See id. at 427. 
60 See id. at 425. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. at 427. 
63 See Tara Mythri Raghavan, In Fear of Cyberterrorism: An Analysis of the 
Congressional Repsonse, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 297, 299 (2003). 
64 See Gore, supra note 20, at 428–29 (citing EDIAS Software Int’l, L.L.C. v. BASIS 
Int’l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D. Ariz. 1996)). 
65 Id. at 423. 
66 Id. at 429 (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 
1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
67 Id. at 436 (quoting Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudon Cty. Library, 2 
F. Supp. 2d 783, 793–94 (E.D. Va. 1998)). 
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railroads, trucks, and highways’” because it “‘serves as a conduit for 
transporting . . . goods.’”68  Courts have likened chatroom conversations to 
answering machine tapes.69  One court stated that online retailer eBay, Inc. 
is like a “brick and mortar” storefront.70  These comparisons were not meant 
to be taken literally.  Instead, the attorneys used something familiar to the 
court (i.e., a source analogue) to help explain or describe an abstract concept 
(i.e., the target analogue, which in these examples includes computers, 
websites, or the internet generally).  Attorneys retrieve concrete examples 
familiar to the judge, and then expect the judge to map relevant 
characteristics from the source to the target.71  Through these comparisons, 
nearly everyone can understand the concepts about computers that the 
attorneys wish to highlight.  Without the metaphors, the literal, technical 
description of how computers store, process, and transmit information could 
take countless pages to explain and still be incomprehensible to most 
readers.72   
Examples of legal concepts being portrayed metaphorically are almost 
endless.  For example,73 consider the following terms of art: long-arm 
statutes, forum shopping, parent corporations, piercing the corporate veil, 
lemon laws, balancing tests, safe-harbor provisions,74 and sunset 
                                                                                                                          
68 Id. at 432 (quoting Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y 
1997)). 
69 Id. at 433 (citing Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 830 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)). 
70 Id. at 450 (citing eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065–66 
(N.D. Cal. 2000)). 
71 As will be discussed later in this Article, relational similarities are often more important 
than surface similarities.  See infra Part III.A.  These computer metaphors provide good 
examples of relational similarities.  For example, a computer may not have many surface 
similarities in common with a filing cabinet (that they both have metal shells is not important).  
Instead, it is the underlying, relational features that map, or transfer, from the concept of a 
filing cabinet (that it provides a system to store, organize, and retrieve information easily) to 
a computer. 
72 See Gore, supra note 20, at 408. 
73 Unless otherwise noted, these examples are found in SMITH, supra note 2, at 207, 212. 
74 Statutes even refer to provisions as “safe harbors.”  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6503 (2012) 
(entitled “[s]afe harbors”); id. § 78u-5 (entitled “[a]pplication of safe harbor for forward-
looking statements).  In a Westlaw search for federal statutes that include the term “safe 
harbor” run on April 17, 2015, 410 results were returned where the term was used in the title 
of a statute, in the body of a statute, or in the statute’s “Notes of Decisions.” 
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provisions.75  These metaphors make it easy for the reader to grasp the 
concepts being discussed.  The first time a law student learns about forum 
shopping, the concept is new and abstract.  Through the metaphor, students 
are able to relate it to something already understood (shopping at different 
stores until finding the best deal).  The mind transfers characteristics of 
shopping to the concept of choosing a more desirable forum in which to file 
a lawsuit.  This comparison makes it easier to conceptualize and remember 
the concept of forum shopping. 
Metaphors and analogies generally serve the same function: they both 
educate the reader about a new, abstract concept through the retrieval and 
mapping of shared characteristics from a source to a target.76  The cognitive 
process that helps people learn through either metaphorical or analogical 
comparisons is essentially the same.77  A plethora of excellent articles has 
examined metaphors in legal writing.78  However, although many scholars 
have used cognitive science to discuss and explain metaphors in legal 
writing, most have not probed into case-based analogies.79  Yet, in legal 
briefs, metaphors and analogies usually serve different purposes.80  
Understanding these differences is important for realizing the need to 
explore analogies separately and in more depth than previously has been 
done.   
                                                                                                                          
75 For example, at least seventeen sections of the Code of Federal Regulations use the 
term “sunset provision,” either in the title or within a section of a regulation.  See, e.g., 17 
C.F.R. § 20.9 (2015); 42 C.F.R. § 403.756 (2015); 47 C.F.R. § 101.79 (2014).   
76 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 1190–91; Linda L. Berger, What Is the Sound of the 
Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the 
Law, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169, 169 (2004). 
77 See Berger, supra note 76, at 174. 
78 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 76; Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and 
Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance 
Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949 (2007); Clay Calvert, Regulating Cyberspace: 
Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Framing of Legal Options, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 541 (1998); Robert C. Cumbow, Cyberspace Must Exceed Its Grasp, or What’s a 
Metaphor? Tropes, Trips and Stumbles on the Info Highway, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 665 
(1997); Gore, supra note 20; Oldfather, supra note 55; Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, 
(S)he Will Come: Judicial Opinions, Metaphors, Baseball, and “The Sex Stuff”, 28 CONN. L. 
REV. 813 (1996).  See also Berger, supra note 21.  Further, Professor Michael R. Smith 
devoted Chapters 9 and 10 of his textbook Advanced Legal Writing to metaphors.  SMITH, 
supra note 2, at 199–248.  For an even more comprehensive list of sources addressing 
metaphors, many in a legal context, see Smith, supra note 6, at app. A at 945–47. 
79 See text accompanying supra notes 8–12. 
80 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 155; SMITH, supra note 2, at 206–18. 
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B. Differences Between Analogies and Metaphors 
Understanding the differences between analogies and metaphors is 
valuable.  Each are tools attorneys should use when advocating.  
Understanding the differences helps to more fully understand each tool 
individually; that is, when and why to use metaphors in legal writing versus 
when and why to use analogies.  Further, understanding the differences 
allows analysis to reach beyond the prior scholarship on metaphors, pushing 
forward our understanding of the much more unexplored use of analogies as 
a tool in legal advocacy.  After discussing the differences, the remainder of 
this Article focuses solely on analogies: on examining and developing 
current knowledge of how to effectively craft case-based analogies. 
1. Difference No. 1: Source Analogues 
The first difference between metaphors and analogies concerns the 
source analogue.81  With metaphors, attorneys have endless options for a 
source analogue.  The concrete image on which the attorney bases her 
metaphor can be anything she believes the reader will be familiar with and 
will have a relational correspondence to the new, abstract concept she is 
attempting to explain.82  The attorney could compare a scared employee to 
a “deer caught in the headlights.”  The attorney could compare a lazy 
employee to a “sloth,” a “bump on a log,” or “dead weight.”  The attorney 
could compare an employee who “rides the coattails of others” (itself a 
metaphor) to a “leech.”  The attorney could compare an employee who has 
been “framed” (again, itself a metaphor) to a “sacrificial lamb.”  The 
attorney could compare a spiteful supervisor to a “schoolyard bully” or a 
“tyrant.”  The attorney could compare a deceitful employee to a “politician” 
or to a “wolf in sheep’s clothing.”  The attorney could describe the work 
environment as “heaven” or “hell.”  The attorney could describe a tense 
situation at work as a “storm brewing” or a “ticking time bomb.”  The 
examples are endless.  Thus, when drafting a metaphor, the attorney can be 
creative and can base her metaphor on almost anything from the real world.83  
The source analogue may be based in the law, but it can also be based on 
anything from the world that is easy for the reader to understand.84   
Legal analogies, on the other hand, have a highly-limited source set.  
The “source” for analogies is limited to precedent: prior cases decided by 
                                                                                                                          
81 Compare Berger, supra note 76, at 205, with Spellman, supra note 11, at 150. 
82 See Berger, supra note 76, at 169. 
83 See id. at 205. 
84 See id. at 169. 
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courts.85  Although the attorney could compare the present case to precedent 
from any jurisdiction, the persuasive value of the analogy will diminish 
significantly if the precedent case is from a non-binding jurisdiction.86  
Therefore, attorneys often have cases from only one state or federal circuit 
from which to choose an analogy.87  Moreover, often only a limited number 
of cases that address a relevant issue based on relevant laws and involving 
relevant facts are available to the attorney to form his or her analogy.88  
Additionally, only those cases that resulted in the same outcome as the 
attorney is seeking in the present case provide beneficial sources for 
analogy.89  Thus, in many situations, attorneys may have only one or two 
source analogues (i.e., precedent cases).90  
2. Difference No. 2: Implied Versus Explicit Mapping 
Metaphors are often most effective when the connection, or the 
relational mapping, between the source and the target is unstated.  Instead, 
the reader must connect the dots.91  The reader should be able to transfer 
                                                                                                                          
85 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 150. 
86 See LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS & ORGANIZATION 56–
57 (5th ed. 2010) (stating that precedent from a non-binding jurisdiction is not mandatory to 
follow). 
87 See Eric Voigt, Choosing the Best Cases: Five Reminders for New Lawyers, LEGAL 
WRITING ED. (Dec. 4, 2013), http://legalwritingeditor.com/2013/12/04/choosing-best-cases-
five-rules-new-lawyers. 
88 See id. 
89 Case-based analogies are useful tools because of the doctrine of stare decisis.  Under 
the doctrine of stare decisis, courts attempt to reach outcomes consistent with those reached 
in prior cases from the same jurisdiction in which the court addressed a similar issue based 
on similar facts.  See id.; Schauer, supra note 5, at 571.  Thus, attorneys analogize to similar 
precedent cases with favorable outcomes.  If a precedent case has a damaging outcome, 
attorneys try to distinguish, rather than analogize to, that case.  See Eugene Volokh, 
Analogizing and Distinguishing Cases, WASH. POST BLOG (Aug. 10, 2009, 2:26 PM) 
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1249928819.shtml.  Examples of fleshed-out analogies, and a 
distinction, are found in Part IV of this Article.   
90 In a common area of law, such as search and seizure, an attorney may have scores of 
relevant cases from which to choose.  But, in an uncommon or very narrow area of law, an 
attorney may have no helpful precedent case at all.  In those situations, the attorney may turn 
to using a metaphor to help fill the gap.    
91 SMITH, supra note 2, at 200 (stating that “while the language involves a comparison, it 
does not include explicit words of comparison.”).  Because of this, metaphors are effective 
when they are “simple, concrete, . . . and concise.”  Julie A. Oseid, The Power of Metaphor: 
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attributes or relations quickly from the source to the target.  For example, if 
an attorney states that an employee was a deer caught in the headlights, the 
attorney should not have to pause and explain what it is about a deer in the 
headlights that is similar to the employee.  The attorney should not have to 
explain that, when looking at oncoming headlights, deer are wide-eyed and 
paralyzed by fear and confusion while staring at the approaching danger.  
The attorney assumes the reader’s worldly experiences provide an 
understanding of how deer often act when looking into an approaching car’s 
headlights.92  If the attorney chooses the source wisely, the reader will 
transfer those concepts to the source—the employee—without having to 
provide any explicit mapping.93   
Legal analogies, on the other hand, take that next step and explicitly 
explain the connection between the source (the precedent case) and the target 
(the present case).94  In effective analogies, the attorney carefully explains 
the details about the precedent case and then explicitly explains what it is 
about that case that relates to the present case: that is, which fact from the 
precedent case is like which fact from the present case, how or why those 
facts are similar, why those facts are important for similar reasons, what 
benefit or policy those facts both further.95  Or, at least, attorneys should do 
this.  Whether an attorney includes this explicit explanation often 
differentiates an effective analogy from an ineffective one.   
Persuasively providing this explicit explanation is difficult.  Cognitive 
science shows that it is important to do, but doing it effectively is a skill and 
a step many attorneys unknowingly omit.96   
3. Difference No. 3: Availability  
The third difference between metaphors and analogies is that metaphors 
fill in where analogies are not useful or possible.97  Both metaphors and 
analogies help the reader understand something new by comparing it to 
                                                                                                                          
Thomas Jefferson’s “Wall of Separation Between Church & State”, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL 
WRITING DIRECTORS 123, 125 (2010).   
92 See Berger, supra note 21, at 276. 
93 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 200. 
94 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 155. 
95 See Stephanie Roberts Hartung & Shailini Jandial George, Promoting In-Depth 
Analysis: A Three-Part Approach to Teaching Analogical Reasoning to Novice Legal 
Writers, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 685, 688–89 (2009). 
96 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 152–53. 
97 See id. at 152; SMITH, supra note 2, at 199. 
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something already known.98  Metaphors connect a new, abstract concept to 
a known concrete image99 to help the reader understand the abstract 
concept.100  Analogies connect a new, undecided case to a precedent case to 
help persuade the judge that the new case should have the same outcome.101 
If useful precedent exists, analogies provide the primary vehicle for 
comparison.102  This is true because of stare decisis.103  However, what if no 
useful precedent exists?  For example, if the court addresses an issue of first 
impression, there may be no precedent cases that provide a helpful 
comparison.104  In these situations, attorneys are simply unable to use the 
tool of analogy.  However, because metaphors can be based not only on prior 
legal decisions but also on nearly anything from the real world, attorneys 
may still be able to reach into their toolbox and draft a metaphor that will 
help push the reader toward the outcome the attorney seeks. 
This is not to say that a metaphor will always be effective.  The attorney 
still has to find a concrete source image that the reader will understand and 
that will have relational properties that can map to the target.105  But, the 
realm of sources from which an attorney can draw a metaphor is essentially 
anything in the world.106  Thus, a creative attorney may be able to craft a 
useful metaphor when no useful analogy exists. 
4. Difference No. 4: Purpose  
Unlike analogies, metaphors typically are not used to predict the 
outcome of cases.107  Metaphors function outside of the concept of applying 
                                                                                                                          
98 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 152; SMITH, supra note 2, at 199. 
99 See Berger, supra note 76, at 169. 
100 See Berger, supra note 21, at 278–79. 
101 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 152–53.  
102 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 150. 
103 See Schauer, supra note 5, at 577 n.13 (citing RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH 
LAW 182–92 (3d ed. 1977)) (discussing that “although in later stages judges are often misled 
in their reliance on precedent, the first stage in judicial reasoning by analogy is the 
determination of the relevant likeness between the previous case and the one before the 
court”). 
104 Case of First Impression, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (a “case of first 
impression” is a “case that presents the court with an issue of law that has not previously been 
decided by any controlling legal authority in that jurisdiction.”). 
105 See Berger, supra note 21, at 278–79. 
106 See Berger, supra note 76, at 169. 
107 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 155.  See also SMITH, supra note 2, at 206–18.  Professor 
Smith lists four uses of metaphors in legal writing: (1) doctrinal metaphors (representing 
substantive legal rights in “figurative, symbolic, [and] metaphoric terms,” such as “piercing 
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precedent to invoke stare decisis.108  Consider the computer and internet 
examples provided previously.109  In all of those examples, the attorneys 
provided the metaphor to help explain the concept of the internet in the way 
the attorneys wanted the court to understand.110  On the other hand, analogies 
are usually (if not always) included to either predict the outcome of a new 
case (if the attorney is writing an inner-office predictive legal memorandum) 
or to advocate for a particular outcome (if the attorney is writing a court 
brief).111   
To put it simply, metaphors are often used to explain a concept.112  
Analogies do not serve this purpose.  Instead, attorneys use analogies to 
explain why the judge should reach a particular outcome in a new, ongoing 
case.113    
5. Difference No. 5: Emphasis  
Metaphors can be used for emphasis.114  Think of a reader who is reading 
a long legal brief about a new or abstract concept.  The reader may be 
struggling to grasp the analysis.  Likely, the brief has provided several pages 
of facts for the reader to remember, legal concepts for the reader to wrestle 
with, statutes to interpret, case law to decipher, etc.  Legal briefs can be 
dense, dull, and tedious to read, as the reader is drowned in information.  
But, if the writer can then introduce a catchy metaphor, which enables the 
reader to step outside the legal realm and connect with something familiar 
from “the real world,” the writer creates a change of pace in the substance.  
The metaphor interjects a familiar, non-legal source into the otherwise legal, 
and possibly dry, conversation.  This change of pace may catch the reader’s 
                                                                                                                          
the corporate veil”); (2) legal method metaphors (“concepts of legal method and legal analysis 
expressed” through metaphor, such as “balancing” tests); (3) stylistic metaphors (using 
metaphors not to address substantive concepts but to add a style to the writing); and (4) 
inherent metaphors (metaphors that are unintentionally crafted but occur in our writing 
because they are inherent to the way people communicate about certain things, such as saying 
the brief will “cast light on a subject”).  Id.  None of the uses for metaphors that Professor 
Smith identified include using metaphors as a way to predict a legal outcome or to 
demonstrate how the present case is controlled by a precedent case.  See id. 
108 See Berger, supra note 76, at 169. 
109 See supra Part II.A; Gore, supra note 20, at 425–27. 
110 See Gore, supra note 20, at 425–27.  See also supra Part II.A. 
111 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 152–53. 
112 See Berger, supra note 21, at 279. 
113 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 155. 
114 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 235. 
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attention, provide a well-appreciated “break” from the legalese, and thus 
draw emphasis to the concept.  If the metaphor is chosen well, it will be a 
memorable part of the brief and its analysis. 
For example, if an attorney compared a person to “the boy who cried 
wolf,”115 most readers would be transported out of the brief, even for a 
moment, to their childhood when they learned the story about the boy who 
cried wolf too many times when no wolf was present.116  Even if the attorney 
chronicled several instances of a person lying, the use of the reference to the 
boy who cried wolf may allow the reader to step outside of the brief and into 
a childhood story, which would be unexpected and perhaps entertaining to 
the reader.  That, in turn, may stick with the reader and thus crystallize a 
belief of the person’s actions.  The writer did not make the comparison to 
prove that the person lied or to prove a legal outcome; instead, the 
comparison emphasized the person’s actions.   
Analogies, on the other hand, are not used to emphasize a point.117  
Instead, they are used to prove a legal outcome.118  An attorney would not 
take the time or effort to explain a prior case and then to compare the present 
case to the precedent simply to emphasize a concept.  Instead, when 
presenting a legal analogy to a precedent case, the attorney is using the 
doctrine of stare decisis to prove that the similarities between the two cases 
are strong enough that the court must (or at least should) reach the same 
outcome in the present case.119  Within an analogy, the attorney includes 
facts or reasoning that leads to an outcome for which the attorney is 
advocating.120  The purpose and function of the analogy is not to emphasize 
but rather to explain the legal analysis and to prove the desired outcome is 
legally appropriate.121     
6. Difference No. 6: Emotion 
As Professor Michael Smith states in his book Advanced Persuasive 
Writing, an “apt metaphor can greatly enhance the emotion generated in 
                                                                                                                          
115 Aesop, The Shepherd’s Boy, in THE FABLES OF AESOP 210 (Joseph Jacobs ed., 1894). 
116 See id. 
117 See Grant Lamound, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward Zalta ed., Spring 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/spr2014/entries/legal-reas-prec.  
118 See id. 
119 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 150. 
120 See id. 
121 See Lamound, supra note 117. 
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readers.”122  Professor Smith provides the following example: “Each 
oppressive practice is one wire in a birdcage; while no one wire could 
prevent the bird’s escape, the wires woven together make a thoroughly 
effective prison.”123  As Professor Smith explains: 
In the document from which this excerpt was taken, the 
writer advances a highly emotional argument: the 
devastating cumulative effect that results from numerous 
individual acts of oppression.  The writer’s use of the 
birdcage metaphor contributes greatly to the feelings of 
dread and sorrow the argument is designed to evoke in the 
reader.124  
It is easy to think of metaphors that could have the similar purpose of 
eliciting an emotional response.  For example, his employer “ratcheted up 
the heat” on him; his overbearing tactics “smothered” her; and she “drowned 
him with guilt.”  With each, the metaphor invokes a palpable response; 
engaging a reader’s emotions touches on pathos (i.e., passion and emotion), 
which, along with ethos (i.e., credibility) and logos (i.e., logic and legal 
reasoning), form the three pillars of persuasion.125  
On the other hand, legal analogies are not used to invoke emotional 
responses.126  Instead, a legal analogy goes straight to the logos, or legal 
reasoning.127  As noted above, attorneys construct the analogy to prove that 
the facts justify a particular legal outcome, just as similar facts lead to the 
same result in a prior case.128  
7. Difference No. 7: Possibility to Annoy 
Metaphors can annoy a reader.129  As one example, “[o]veruse of 
metaphor is a serious, yet common problem in persuasive writing.”130  
Professor Smith believes that “many writers undermine their documents’ 
overall effectiveness by using metaphors indiscriminately.  The truly 
                                                                                                                          
122 SMITH, supra note 2, at 234. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 233–35.  See generally LANE COOPER, THE RHETORIC OF 
ARISTOTLE (1932).   
126 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 152–53. 
127 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 234–35. 
128 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 155. 
129 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 236. 
130 Id. 
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effective stylist uses metaphor selectively to emphasize particular points.”131  
Beyond being overused, metaphors can annoy readers when used 
inappropriately or ineffectively.132  For example, mixed metaphors133 can be 
confusing or distracting.134  As illustrated in Part IV, metaphors where the 
connection between the source and target is not obvious can be confusing or 
even frustrating to a reader.135  Such metaphors fail to provide the 
explanatory effect that metaphors should deliver, and they may alienate a 
reader who feels annoyed that he does not “get it.”136   
Analogies, on the other hand, largely avoid the above problems.  
Whereas with metaphors the writer should leave the connection between the 
source and target unstated for the reader to realize on his own, with analogies 
the writer should explicitly state and explain the connections between the 
precedent case and the present case.137  Thus, unless the analogy is poorly 
written, the reader will never be confused or frustrated that he does not “get” 
the comparison made through an analogy.138  The judge may ultimately 
disagree that the prior case is controlling, but if the analogy is presented 
properly, the reader should always be able to at least understand the 
comparison and the point the writer is making.    
8. Difference No. 8: Use to Entertain 
Unlike analogies, writers may incorporate metaphors into a legal brief 
simply to entertain the reader.139  Understanding a metaphor, or “making the 
mental connection between two seemingly dissimilar things[,] is often 
pleasing to a reader.”140  This charming and entertaining effect can make the 
reader more receptive to the brief; “[o]nce the reader falls into this positive 
and receptive mood, the writer’s substantive point will be more welcome.”141 
                                                                                                                          
131 Id. 
132 See id. 
133 Id. (defining a mixed metaphor as a metaphor that contains incompatible references, 
such as, “[a] careful reading of the contract reveals a loophole that we can hang our hat on”). 
134 See id. at 236–37. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. at 200; Hunter, supra note 3, at 153, 155. 
138 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 153. 
139 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 234. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
2016] PERSUADING WITH PRECEDENT 479 
 
Analogies, on the other hand, are not included to entertain the reader.142  
They are much more practical: they do not charm or entertain a reader, they 
carry the analysis;143 they prove the legal conclusion;144 and they justify the 
advocated-for result.145  Metaphors can be helpful tools in some briefs, but 
analogies are crucial components in most briefs, especially those in which 
the facts fall into a gray area in the law and the outcome is not obvious.146    
 
III. ANALOGICAL STUDIES APPLIED TO LEGAL WRITING 
Though humans process information received in metaphorical or 
analogical form similarly, there are significant differences in how to draft 
each.147  This Part discusses studies from two different disciplines that have 
examined how people, when presented with analogical information, make 
connections and process the information.  This Part describes each study and 
then extrapolates what attorneys can apply to their legal writing based on the 
results of each study.  This Part then discusses how attorneys can use this 
information in their approaches to legal research and when they begin 
drafting analogies.        
                                                                                                                          
142 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 1191. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 This section explains the differences between analogies and distinctions when 
attorneys include them in briefs.  Although additional differences exist between analogies 
and metaphors, see, e.g., Smith, supra note 6, at 921–23, some of the additional differences 
are not as relevant to brief writing, and thus are not included in this section. 
For an example of an additional difference, Professor Smith discusses how certain legal 
concepts have become known more by the metaphor used to describe them than they have 
the wording of the actual law itself.  See id.  Interestingly, over time, the understanding of the 
law can sometimes change based on how the metaphor itself is understood.  See Louis J. 
Sirico, Jr., Failed Constitutional Metaphors: The Wall of Separation and the Penumbra, 45 
U. RICH. L. REV. 459, 461 (2011).  The focus becomes the metaphor rather than the underlying 
statute.  See id. at 459.  Such a concern would not occur with analogies because an analogy 
is specific to the one present case for which the briefs are being filed.  See Hunter, supra note 
3, at 153.  Even if the outcome is determined by the strength or persuasiveness of the analogy, 
attorneys in a subsequent case will have to create a new analogy to incorporate the new target 
(the facts of the new case).  See id.  Outside of this footnote, this Article will not address any 
differences beyond those that are relevant to their uses within an attorney’s specific brief.  
147 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 152; SMITH, supra note 2, at 199. 
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A. Psychology Studies 
Psychologists and cognitive scientists Dedre Gentner and Arthur 
Markman, both leaders in the study of analogies,148 conducted the following 
study.149  A set of pictures showed a car being towed by a tow truck, and that 
same car now towing a motorboat.150  The subjects were shown the two 
pictures and asked to match the object from the first picture with its 
corresponding object from the second picture.151  When subjects were asked 
to answer quickly, they often pointed out the cars as being the match.152  
Thus, these subjects were spotting and connecting the items that had surface 
(i.e., factual, explicit, or visual) similarities.153  However, subjects who were 
given more time to answer often matched the car from the first picture and 
the motorboat from the second picture.154  Thus, these subjects were spotting 
and connecting the relational similarities.155  The subjects identified and 
valued the role each item was playing and the purpose for the items; both 
the car in the first picture and the tow truck in the second picture were 
serving the same role and function of towing another vehicle.156 
 Other research supports this outcome, suggesting that people under 
time-induced stress, or people trying to process a large amount of 
information at once, notice surface similarities more readily than relational 
similarities.157  For example, in a series of three experiments, psychologists 
Robert Goldstone and Doug Medin measured what similarities subjects 
noted between various pictures depending on the deadlines given to the 
subjects to respond.158  Goldstone and Medin observed that if a person is 
                                                                                                                          
148 See Curriculum Vitae of Arthur B. Markman, U. TEX. DEP’T PSYCHOL., 
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/psychology/faculty/markman (last visited Jan. 22, 2016); 
Curriculum Vitae of Dedre Gentner, NW. U. DEP’T PSYCHOL., http://www.psychology. 
northwestern.edu/people/faculty/core/profiles/dedre-gentner.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2016). 
149 See generally Arthur B. Markman & Dedre Gentner, Structural Alignment During 
Similarity Comparisons, 25 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 431 (1993). 
150 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 151. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
153 Id. 
154 See id. 
155 Id. 
156 See id.  This study is described and discussed in detail by cognitive scientists Arthur 
B. Markman and Dedre Gentner.  See Markman & Gentner, supra note 149, at 437–39.  
157 See Gentner & Smith, supra note 27, at 134. 
158 For a detailed discussion and description of this study, see generally Robert Goldstone 
& Doug Medin, Time Course of Comparison, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: LEARNING, 
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under time pressure, that person is more likely to match surface similarities 
instead of relational similarities.159 
This observation is especially noteworthy because prior research has 
shown that strong relational similarities make more effective analogies than 
do strong surface similarities.160  As stated by leading cognitive scientist 
Dedre Gentner, “[R]elational mapping is the essence of analogy.”161  
Carrying this concept into legal writing, what makes a precedent case useful 
to draw an analogy to depends more so on the relational similarities the 
attorney can draw than it does between the surface similarities the attorney 
may point out.162  In other words, it is much more important why facts 
matter—what it is about the facts that lead the same conclusion—than what 
the facts themselves are.  However, it is easier for many people to identify 
surface similarities than it is to notice relational similarities.163  
Thus, to draft effective analogies, attorneys must focus more on 
relational similarities than surface similarities.  This is especially true when, 
as often happens, the facts in the precedent cases do not line up perfectly 
with the facts in the present case being briefed.  Persuasive analogies can be 
drawn between a present case and a precedent case, even when there is little 
on the surface, factually, that seems similar.164  The following hypothetical 
demonstrates this.  
Consider a person arrested for burglary after he broke the window of a 
homeless person’s car and stole a gun out of the car.  Assume the burglary 
statute requires that a person break into a dwelling with the intent to commit 
a crime (as many burglary statutes do).  All of the elements of this burglary 
statute are satisfied except for the “dwelling” requirement.   
To determine if the dwelling requirement is met, the court must 
determine whether a homeless person’s car is a dwelling.  Aside from easy 
cases in which the “dwelling” requirement was not disputed (such as when 
an individual’s current home was broken into), precedent exists in which 
                                                                                                                          
MEMORY & COGNITION 29 (1994).  For a summary of this study, see Gentner & Smith, supra 
note 27, at 134. 
159 See Gentner & Smith, supra note 27, at 134. 
160 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 151; Markman & Gentner, supra note 149, at 431, 
433, 441. 
161 Gentner & Smith, supra note 27, at 130. 
162 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 152. 
163 See id. at 151–52. 
164 See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 
363 (1997). 
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suspects broke into seasonal cabins or unoccupied rental properties.165  
Assume that courts typically have held that summer cabins are dwellings, 
but that unoccupied rental properties are not dwellings.  Additionally, 
assume there is one precedent in which a person broke into another person’s 
car parked on the curb while the person was in his home.  For purposes of 
the burglary statute, assume the court in that case held that the car was not a 
dwelling.   
To draw analogies to those cases, especially in a prosecutor’s effort to 
persuade the judge that the homeless person’s car was a dwelling, the 
attorney must consider and highlight relational similarities underlying the 
facts (rather than the surface similarities of the facts) between the present 
case and the precedent cases.  On the surface, the case that seems most 
similar is the case in which the defendant broke into another person’s car.  
Especially for a reader who is reading quickly, the “car cases” seem similar 
because they are the only two cases in which the property broken into was a 
car.  On the other hand, the cases in which the defendants broke into homes 
seem very different factually.  Not only did those precedent cases involve 
houses while the present case involves a car, the victims in the precedent 
cases were homeowners, while the victim in the present case was homeless.  
How can a person break into a dwelling when he broke into a car, and the 
victim was homeless?  On the surface, the precedent cases involving 
burglaries in homes do not seem similar at all.  Instead, on the surface level, 
the precedent in which the defendant broke into a car seems most similar.   
 However, the skilled attorney may be able to convince the reader that 
the precedent cases involving homes are actually very similar (i.e., 
analogous) by focusing the reader away from the obvious surface facts that 
the reader may have identified and, instead, to the relational aspects.  In 
addition, by focusing the reader on the relational similarities, the attorney 
may be able to prove that the precedent involving the car is very different 
from the present case. 
To focus on the relational similarities, the attorney has to think in terms 
of what it is about the facts that matter; that is, not what the facts are but 
why they matter.  Why is a home a dwelling?  A home is a dwelling because 
it is the person’s primary shelter; that is, the place where the person keeps 
                                                                                                                          
165 The concept for this hypothetical is based generally on cases discussed in the following 
two American Law Reports annotations: Occupant’s Absence from Residential Structure as 
Affecting Nature of Offense as Burglary or Breaking and Entering, 20 A.L.R. 4TH 349 (1983); 
Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Burglary, Breaking, or Entering of Motor Vehicle, 72 A.L.R. 
4TH 710 (1989).  
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most of his or her personal property and sleeps at night.166  In the present 
case, because the person was homeless, he relied on his car for shelter, he 
kept what few possessions he had locked in his car, and he slept in the car 
each night.  The fact that it is a car does not make it a dwelling.  Instead, it 
is the role that the car plays in his life—the purpose of the car for him—that 
matters.  It is not the fact itself that matters, but it is the thing about the fact 
that matters.  And, it is precisely that function, that role, that thing about the 
fact that makes his car like a homeowner’s house for purposes of what 
constitutes a “dwelling.”  Thus, it is the relational similarities that make the 
precedent about houses more controlling than the precedent about the car, 
despite that the precedent about the car may have a more obvious surface 
similarity.  Focusing on and explaining the relational similarity makes the 
analogy stronger.167 
As the psychology experiments demonstrated, when making choices 
quickly, people identify surface similarities.168  However, when readers take 
more time to contemplate similarities, they may then identify relational 
similarities.169  Moreover, when and if they do take more time, those 
relational similarities will be important and will become the driving force 
                                                                                                                          
166 If a court states these reasons, then the attorney should cite to these reasons in an 
illustration of the case that precedes the analogy.  Then, in the subsequent analogy, the 
attorney should state the facts from each case (the precedent case and the present case) that 
share a relational similarity.  Then, the attorney should explicitly explain the relational 
similarity by stating why the reasoning from the prior case also applies to the present case.  
However, even if the precedent cases do not state these reasons, attorneys can still identify 
and explain relational connections to support their analogies.  The attorney would still want 
to illustrate the precedent case so the reader learns its facts and outcome.  Then, the attorney 
still should state the facts from each case that share a relational similarity.  Then, the attorney 
should still explicitly describe the relational similarity underlying both sets of facts that lead 
to the same outcome.  Like anything in legal writing, the analogy will be more persuasive if 
the relational similarities are based on reasons courts have identified as being important.  But, 
even if the relational connection is based on an attorney’s own observation instead of being 
based on important reasons courts have identified in prior cases, providing a relational 
connection is critical to improving the strength and persuasiveness of the analogy.  See 
Spellman, supra note 11, at 151; Markman & Gentner, supra note 149, at 431, 433, 441. 
167 “In cases where a highly systematic relational structure can indeed be mapped into the 
target domain, we have a powerful analogy.”  Dedre Gentner & Russell Landers, Analogical 
Reminding: A Good Match is Hard to Find, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON SYSTEMS, MAN AND CYBERNETICS 5 (1985).  
168 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 151. 
169 See id. 
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behind what makes the items similar.170  With legal writing, legal readers are 
usually overloaded and in a hurry.171  Whether the reader is a partner reading 
an associate’s predictive memo, or whether the reader is a judge reading an 
attorney’s brief, the reader wants to read and understand the document 
quickly because that memo or brief is just one of many tasks the reader has 
to shift his attention to throughout the day.  It is possible, or even likely, that 
the reader will read the document when the reader’s attention and focus are 
challenged, such as quickly before a client meeting or court hearing, during 
interrupted spurts between phone calls, near the end of a long workday, or 
on the train home.  It is dangerous to assume that the reader will be reading 
slowly, focusing intently, and contemplating carefully each piece of 
information provided in a thirty-page brief.  It is dangerous to assume the 
reader will naturally comprehend the relational connections between items.  
Instead, when in a hurry, the reader may spot and focus on the surface 
similarities instead.172  The surface similarities between cases are often not 
significant; they often will not support the argument nearly as well as the 
deeper, relational similarities.173  Thus, it is important that the writer make 
the effort to state the relational similarities explicitly for the reader.   
Even if the relational similarities seem obvious to the writer, the writer 
takes a big risk by assuming the relation is obvious to the reader.  The writer 
has researched the cases, decided why certain cases provide helpful support, 
considered why some may be more helpful than others, and ultimately 
chosen those to which analogies can be drawn.  During this process, the 
writer must realize two things.  First, the writer must make these decisions 
by looking past surface similarities and instead look for the more important 
relational similarities.174  Second, this process puts the writer in the position 
of the second group of subjects in the tow-truck study—those given more 
time to contemplate the similarity between the two pictures.175  The reader, 
on the other hand, has not gone through this process of carefully considering 
the precedent.  Instead, the reader is learning about the precedent cases (and 
perhaps the facts of the present case) for the first time while reading the 
memo or brief.  And, the reader is likely hoping to read the document 
                                                                                                                          
170 See id. 
171 See Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked, and Wondering 
Where Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 2015, 2:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/entry/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b. 
172 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 151. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
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quickly.  Therefore, the reader will often be more in the position of the first 
group of subjects in the tow-truck study—those who identified the similarity 
quickly.176  Thus, readers may identify the surface similarity instead of the 
deeper, underlying relational connection.   
It is possible that the reader will slow down, focus, and contemplate the 
analysis as he or she is reading, especially in appellate briefs when a clerk 
may be the audience.  But, especially with state trial-level briefs, it is also 
possible that the reader will not have the time or the concentration to slow 
down, focus, and contemplate the analysis deeply.  It is risky for a writer to 
simply illustrate a precedent case and assume the reader will “see the 
connection” or “make the match” at the deeper, relational level.  If the reader 
fails to do so, the writer has failed to communicate the analysis as 
persuasively as she could have.  The writer has failed to get the value out of 
the precedent in a way that will benefit her client’s position.  In fact, what 
the writer thinks the reader is learning from the brief and what the reader 
actually learns may be two different things.   
Thus, a well-executed analogy in legal writing should always go beyond 
discussing past cases; the writer must explicitly connect each precedent case 
to the present case.  Additionally, when doing so, the writer must not simply 
say the cases are analogous and point out the factual similarities.  Instead, 
the writer must take the next step and map the relational similarities for the 
reader.  Relational similarities are the most important, but they are also the 
similarities that a reader (who is less familiar with the precedent case and 
the present cases than the writer is) is more likely to miss when reading a 
brief quickly.     
B. Physics Study 
Physicists Michelene Chi, Paul Feltovich, and Robert Glaser performed 
an experiment to study expertise and problem solving in people.177  In the 
experiment, the physicists grouped subjects into two groups: experts and 
novices.178  The experts were eight advanced Ph.D. physics students, and the 
novices were eight undergraduate students who had just completed one 
semester of mechanics.179  The physicists asked each subject to categorize 
                                                                                                                          
176 See id. 
177 See generally Michelene T. H. Chi, Paul J. Feltovich & Robert Glaser, Categorization 
and Representation of Physics Problems by Experts and Novices, 5 COGNITIVE SCI. 121 
(1981). 
178 See id. at 121. 
179 Id. at 123. 
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twenty-four physics problems, each of which were typed on index cards.180  
The subjects were asked to sort the “problems into groups based on 
similarities of solution.”181  Then, the subjects were required to sort the cards 
simply by viewing them, not by solving them first and then grouping 
them.182  
By examining the results, the physicists learned that the novices grouped 
the cards based on surface similarities.183  By surface similarities, the 
physicists meant “(a) the objects referred to in the problem (e.g., a spring, 
an inclined plane); (b) the literal physics terms mentioned in the problems 
(e.g., friction, center of mass); or (c) the physical configuration described in 
the problem (i.e., relations among physical objects . . .).”184  In other words, 
the novices grouped the problems based on the “facts” involved in each. 
On the other hand, the physicists observed that, “[f]or [the] experts, 
surface features do not seem to be the bases for categorization. . . . It appears 
that the experts classif[ied] according to the major physics principle 
governing the solution of each problem,” such as Conservation of Energy or 
Newton’s Second Law (F=MA).185  The experts grouped the problems based 
on the “deep structure” (i.e., the underlying principle) of each problem.186  
In other words, the novices grouped the cards based on surface similarities 
between the problems, while the experts grouped the cards based on 
relational similarities. 
This study indicates that experts value, think in terms of, and find 
importance in the reason for things.187  This can have interesting implications 
for legal writing.   
C. Application of the Studies to Legal Brief Writing  
First, to become an expert at legal analysis and writing, attorneys must 
look for precedent cases that exhibit relational similarities rather than 
surface similarities.188  This is difficult because the relational similarities do 
not expose themselves as clearly as surface similarities.189  However, until 
an attorney develops that ability, the attorney will operate closer to the level 
                                                                                                                          
180 Id. at 123–24.  
181 Id. at 124. 
182 See id. 




187 See id. at 130. 
188 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 153.   
189 See id. at 151. 
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of a novice, rather than that of an expert, in legal analysis and persuasive 
writing. 
Second, the attorney writing a brief to the court must understand that the 
reader—the judge—will be an expert at analyzing legal issues.  The judge 
may not be an expert about the facts of the present case, the area of law (or 
specific laws) pertinent to the legal dispute, or the precedent cases discussed 
in the brief.  However, through years of practice, the judge is likely an expert 
at considering legal arguments and making legal conclusions about issues 
presented.  Thus, the judge will be more interested in—and persuaded by—
precedent with important relational similarities to the present case instead of 
precedent with just surface similarities.190  Knowing that a judge will likely 
find relational significance most important, attorneys will be most 
persuasive when presenting precedent cases as analogous to the present case 
if they focus on and explain those relational similarities. 
Interestingly, some question whether judges are experts at legal analysis.  
For example, Professor Barbara Spellman writes that “[j]udges have had lots 
of practice using analogy; yet, they might not actually be ‘experts’ because 
just as there is no real generalized expertise in ‘problem solving’ it is not 
clear that there can be a generalized expertise in analogy use.”191  However, 
it is safe for practitioners to write briefs viewing judges more as experts than 
as novices in solving legal issues.  Not only do judges spend years grappling 
with legal issues as practitioners, but also they spend years reading briefs, 
listening to arguments, and making conclusions about legal issues as judges.  
Even if judges are not experts, Spellman notes that “[b]ecause analogical 
reasoning is a core component of IQ, and because judges are likely to be a 
more intelligent group than a random collection of folks, judges are more 
likely to be better than average at analogical reasoning.”192  Spellman then 
writes, “More important, however, judges . . . know that when using 
analogies it is important to look for relational similarities and—because of 
their specialized training in legal content—they know which relational 
similarities matter within their domains of expertise.”193  Thus, when writing 
to an audience who looks for and values relational similarities (i.e., judges), 
an attorney will provide a more thorough, reliable, credible, and thus 
persuasive argument when she highlights and explains the relational 
similarity between helpful precedent cases and the present case. 
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Further, even if judges are not experts at legal analysis, this does not 
mean attorneys should not bother explicitly stating the relational similarity.  
If judges are not experts, and thus may not identify the relational similarity 
themselves, that is even more reason to explain the relational similarity 
explicitly to ensure the important point does not go unrealized.  If the judge 
has already identified the relational similarity on her own, the attorney can 
increase his ethos, or credibility, with the judge by confirming that he also 
understands the precedent and analysis on a deeper level than the superficial 
facts.  On the other hand, if the judge has not already identified the relational 
similarity, then the attorney can help the judge to see and understand the 
analysis on that deeper level.  Thus, the psychology studies194 and the 
physics study,195 when applied to legal analysis, indicate that an attorney can 
improve her persuasiveness by explicitly connecting and explaining the 
relational similarities between cases. 
In addition, if judges are not experts at legal analysis, then many 
practicing attorneys with much less experience are not either.  But, a 
practicing attorney can become an expert much more quickly—or at least 
become much more effective—if he or she understands how humans process 
analogical information and can focus on relational connections.196 
Realizing and appreciating the importance of relational similarities in 
effective and persuasive analogies is critical. Additionally, realizing that 
judges may not connect the relational similarities on their own is similarly 
important.  The sooner an attorney understands and focuses on it during 
research—choosing precedent cases based as much or more on relational 
similarities than surface similarities—the sooner the attorney will become a 
more effective brief writer and persuasive advocate. Consider the attorney 
in a fast-paced legal environment who must research and write briefs quickly 
while juggling myriad demands on her time and attention.  That attorney 
may go years, or possibly much of her career, without understanding the 
crucial importance of identifying helpful cases by searching beneath the 
surface and seeking out relational comparisons.  Alternatively, even if the 
attorney understands this concept, a hurried attorney may not actually be 
executing it in practice when writing briefs.   
This understanding is crucial for an attorney in two distinct aspects of 
legal writing.  First, it is crucial in case selection.  Thus, it affects what an 
attorney looks for when researching helpful case law.  As noted, studies have 
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shown that factual similarities are easier to spot, even though decision 
makers find relational similarities more important.197  In addition, studies 
have shown that experts are more effective than novices are at retrieving and 
using analogies from different domains.198  Translated to legal writing, 
experts are more effective than novices are at noticing relational similarities 
and applying precedent cases that do not share similar facts with the present 
case.  Stated in reverse, novices are not as skilled at spotting analogous cases 
when the precedent case does not share obvious surface similarities with the 
present case.   
It is easy to see how this negatively affects novice (or hurried) attorneys 
when researching for the best precedent to support their arguments.  While 
researching, the novice (or hurried) attorney may analyze his research results 
and skim the cases looking only for cases with the closest factual similarities 
to the present case.  The attorney may end his research after being satisfied 
that he has found a few favorable cases that “match up” fairly well factually.  
The attorney may skim over cases that, on the surface, did not match up 
factually as well.  But, if the attorney had dug deeper, had been looking for 
not only factual similarities but also cases in which the court explained the 
significance of the facts (i.e., why the facts mattered, why the facts led to the 
court’s outcome, why the facts satisfied the purpose or intent underlying a 
rule, etc.), then the attorney may have found cases better supporting his 
client’s position.  
Consider the dwelling example again.199  The cases that upon a quick 
review may have seemed most factually similar (e.g., precedent in which a 
car was broken into) would not end up as the best cases to analogize to for 
support.  Analogizing to cases with surface similarities may prove helpful, 
but being able to support the argument with favorable cases that share 
relational similarities is crucial.  A novice attorney may quickly dismiss 
cases when the facts do not seem to line up on their face or, even worse, 
never find the cases in the first place.  However, the expert attorney will seek 
out those cases in her research. 
Second, after choosing a better set of precedent cases, the attorney who 
understands the importance of relational similarities must then highlight and 
explicitly explain the relational similarities when the attorney drafts the 
brief.  After noting the important facts from the precedent case and the 
                                                                                                                          
197 See Keith J. Holyoak & Kyunghee Koh, Surface and Structural Similarity in 
Analogical Transfer, 15 MEMORY & COGNITION 332, 338 (1987). 
198 See id. 
199 In that hypothetical, a homeless person’s car was broken into, and the question for the 
court was whether the car is a “dwelling.”  See supra Part II.A.   
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reasons why the court found those facts important, the attorney must then 
identify the corresponding important facts from the present case and 
demonstrate why the reasons noted in the precedent case apply to the facts 
in the present case as well.  Surface similarities may catch a judge’s 
attention, but the relational similarities will prove to the judge that the cases 
are indeed analogous.     
Choosing cases this way, and then explaining the similarities in this way, 
distinguishes an effective legal writer or advocate from a less effective one.  
The sooner an attorney learns, understands, and applies this concept to 
research and writing, the sooner the attorney will improve at legal analysis, 
persuasion, and brief writing, and the more effective at those tasks he or she 
will be. 
Effective legal writers must be good at several skills, but an attorney’s 
skill at identifying and explaining relational similarities is crucial and can be 
the difference between a winning and a losing brief.  Some skills, such as 
executing accurate grammar, are obvious to most readers.200  Choosing cases 
and explaining analogies with a focus on relational similarities are less 
obvious, but considerably more important, to the success of the brief.201  A 
judge may be annoyed by poor grammar, but a judge will overlook poor 
grammar if the judge perceives the law as favoring one party over the 
other.202  Providing effective and persuasive analogies goes directly to the 
substance of the law and helps convince a judge that the case law favors or 
requires a particular outcome.203   
IV. EXAMPLES OF LESS-EFFECTIVE AND MORE-EFFECTIVE 
ANALOGIES 
The prior Part discusses how humans process information through 
analogies and how attorneys can use that information in the context of legal 
writing.  With that background, this Part applies the concepts discussed 
above to three concrete examples of case-based analogies, demonstrating the 
differences between weak analogies (i.e., those that fall short of 
incorporating the above-mentioned knowledge) and strong analogies (i.e., 
those that apply the above-mentioned knowledge effectively).     
                                                                                                                          
200 See Mark Matthewson, In-House Editors: Letting the Experts Do It, 1 SCRIBES J. 
LEGAL WRITING 152, 152–53 (1990). 
201 Lamound, supra note 117. 
202 Poor grammar, though, can harm your credibility, which hurts your persuasiveness.  
See SMITH, supra note 2, at 182, 186–87. 
203 Lamound, supra note 117. 
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A. Comparing Surface Similarities 
The first step in crafting a strong analogy is choosing a strong source 
domain, i.e., a strong precedent case.  As discussed in Part II, the best 
precedent may not appear factually similar on its face, but the court may 
have explained why the facts in that case led to its outcome, and those 
reasons may apply well to the facts in the present case, too.204  That relational 
similarity may make that case a very persuasive case for the attorney to 
discuss and compare.  Alternatively, the attorney may find precedent cases 
with very similar facts but in which the court did not explain why those facts 
matter.  Instead, the court just stated the rules, the facts, and then the 
outcome.  If the attorney is lucky, she will find a case that checks all the 
boxes: a case that has strong factual similarities and in which the court 
explained why those facts are important.  That is the ideal case.  But, 
regardless of which type of case the attorney has available to her, the process 
of working through the analogy in the brief is the same.205  The attorney has 
to first explicitly state the facts from each case that are similar.206  Second, 
the attorney has to explicitly explain why those facts are important, i.e., what 
it is about those facts that lead to the advocated outcome.207 
When the significant fact from each case is a direct match, this 
comparison can be as simple as saying, for example, “In both cases, the 
assailant slammed the victim’s head onto a concrete sidewalk.”  Notice the 
attorney still explicitly stated the factual similarity.  The attorney did not say 
that the cases are analogous and leave it up to the reader to spot the similarity 
(even if the similarity seems obvious to the attorney).     
When the significant fact from each case is not a direct match, then the 
attorney especially has to point out the fact from each case that the attorney 
is comparing: For example, “In Smith, the assailant slammed the victim’s 
head onto a concrete sidewalk, and in the present case, Johnson held the 
defendant’s head under the water in the ocean.”  This surface similarity is 
not a direct match, but the attorney has realized there is something about 
slamming a person’s head onto concrete that is similar to holding a person’s 
head under water.  The similarity is relational.  What is it that is the same 
about both of those facts?  Though the defendants cannot control or possess 
the sidewalk or the ocean, both are still deadly weapons because the 
                                                                                                                          
204 See supra Part II. 
205 See Hartung & George, supra note 95, at 688–89. 
206 See id. at 689; EDWARDS, supra note 86, at 110; DAVID S. ROMANTZ & KATHLEEN 
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defendants used each to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim.  If done 
well, the attorney will next explain that relational similarity.  But, the 
attorney has to first explicitly state the specific facts that share a relational 
similarity.   
The less obvious the relational similarity, the more the point is 
exemplified.  Take the following example: “In Wilson, the assailant was 
carrying a butcher knife in his hand when he approached the victim, while 
in the present case the defendant had his brother by his side when he 
approached the victim.”  It is very possible that the facts, on their face, seem 
so different that the reader may not see any factual similarity and thus not 
look for or realize any relational similarity that may exist. 
Though the need to explicitly state the surface-level similarity increases 
as the less similar the facts appear, the attorney should still begin every 
analogy by stating the factual similarity.  This helps cement the first part of 
processing an analogy, the retrieval process.208  Especially if the attorney has 
discussed multiple precedents, aligning the facts at the beginning of the 
written analogy helps the reader retrieve the appropriate precedent (and the 
specific facts) in his or her mind.  And, it sets the foundation for the second 
part of processing an analogy: the mapping process.209   
In addition, this explicit factual comparison becomes even more 
important if there are several important facts from the precedent case, 
several important facts from the present case, or several important facts from 
both cases.  Further, this explicit factual comparison becomes even more 
important if there are multiple precedent cases that the attorney explained to 
the reader before analogizing to them.  In either of those situations, the 
explicit factual comparison is important to help the reader with the retrieval 
process.210  Even if the facts seem like an obvious match to the attorney, the 
reader may not have spotted the surface similarities on his own.  It is never 
wise to assume the reader made the connection on his own.211  The attorney 
should make it easy for the reader.  The reader is not likely to mind when 
the attorney makes his job easier.  And, if the attorney assumes the reader 
would spot the factual similarities and thus did not bother to highlight them, 
but the reader (reading quickly) in fact did not make the connection, then the 
analogy that could have supported the argument will be missed. 
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This is the first crucial step in drafting a strong analogy for the reader: 
explicitly stating the factual comparison.  Yet, often the attorney fails to 
accomplish this, even if he or she attempts to do so.212  For example, 
attorneys will often begin an analogy by comparing things that are not really 
facts at all.  Instead, the attorney references a factual comparison without 
stating the actual facts, assuming that the reader will see the comparison.  
Several examples of this follow. 
1. Comparing a Fact to a Rule 
Consider the following hypothetical analogy:  
The Harmon case is analogous to the present case with 
respect to a private setting.  Like in the present case, in 
which the student assaulted his girlfriend under the 
bleachers at a basketball game, the court in Harmon stated 
that settings are private, even if other people are nearby, as 
long as nobody is likely to see the incident occur.   
This attempt at comparing surface similarities fails because it compares 
being “under the bleachers at a basketball game,” which is a fact, with a rule: 
“settings are private, even if other people are nearby, as long as nobody is 
likely to see the incident occur.”  The rule is important, and it is appropriate 
to apply the facts to the rule, but not in the first part of the analogy, which is 
expected to first link together the facts from the two cases.  In this example, 
the attorney is relying on the reader to retrieve the proper facts and to map 
them between the source (precedent case) and the target (present case).  But, 
if the reader does not do so (especially if there were several other facts 
involved, and especially if other precedent had been discussed), then the 
mapping process will be incomplete and the analogy will be weakened.  The 
writer may still prove his point by way of rule-based reasoning (applying 
facts to a rule),213 but the writer lost the opportunity to do what he was 
intending, which was to support and prove his point with case-based 
reasoning (comparing the present case to precedent cases and thus using 
stare decisis to support the argument).214 The reader may still do this on her 
own.  Because the analogy is not executed properly, the writer has left it to 
the reader to retrieve and map from the Harmon case to the present case.  If 
the reader fails to, or does so inaccurately, the attorney’s argument becomes 
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weaker than it otherwise would have been if truly based on a fully-explained 
analogy to favorable precedent.  It is the writer’s task to directly and 
explicitly articulate the surface similarities first and the relational similarities 
second.   
2. Comparing a Fact to Reasoning 
Now consider this hypothetical example:  
The Harmon case is analogous to the present case with 
respect to a private setting.  In the present case, the student 
assaulted his girlfriend under the bleachers at a basketball 
game, and in the Harmon case, the court noted that people 
are not likely to look behind them during a movie.   
This shares a similar problem as the comparison in the prior example: 
there is no factual comparison.  The court reasoned that people are not likely 
to look behind them during a movie.  This reasoning is very important; it is 
what makes the analogy work.  It is the beginning of the explanation of the 
relational similarity: why the facts are similar and why they are important.  
But, the attorney must start the analogy by identifying the specific source 
and the specific target,215 and only then map from the source to the target by 
explaining why both sets of facts share the same relational components.216  
Without the act of working through these steps, the analogy is incomplete.217  
As in the prior example, the analogy only works if the reader fills in the gaps, 
which is a dangerous expectation for the writer to rely on.  The connections 
may seem obvious to the attorney who spent hours drafting the brief and 
thinking about which cases to use.  However, the connections may not be 
obvious to the reader who, for example, may have been reading quickly 
while juggling the facts and several precedent cases or who is skeptical 
because she knows the writer is trying to persuade her. 
3. Comparing a Fact to a Holding 
Now consider this hypothetical example:  
                                                                                                                          
215 In broad terms, the source is the Harmon case and the target is the present case.  In 
narrow terms, the source in this analogy is the facts from the Harmon case (that the assault 
occurred in the back of a dark movie theater) and the target is the facts from the present case 
(that the assault occurred under the bleachers during a basketball game).   
216 The relational component is that people are unlikely to look under the bleachers during 
a basketball game, just as people are unlikely to look behind them during a movie, making 
the people in both situations out of view of others, and thus in a “private” setting. 
217 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 150. 
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The Harmon case is analogous to the present case with 
respect to a private setting.  Like in the present case, in 
which the student assaulted his girlfriend under the 
bleachers at a basketball game, in Harmon, the assault 
occurred in a private setting.   
As above, there is no factual comparison.  The attorney states the 
holding from the Harmon case (that the assault occurred in private).  The 
purpose of the analogy is to prove why the court should find that the assault 
under the bleachers occurred in a private setting.  The comparison, though, 
is similar to circular reasoning.  It states that the cases are analogous because 
the court in Harmon found that the assault occurred in private.  However, 
the attorney does not state the facts from Harmon that are similar to the facts 
in the present case; the attorney only states the conclusion.  Even if the 
analogy was preceded by an explanation of the Harmon case, the attorney is 
assuming the reader will match the surface similarities.  Perhaps the reader 
will.  But, even if the reader does, the analogy is incomplete and sloppy when 
the surface similarities are not explicitly matched.218 
The examples above are intended to highlight common errors in the 
construction of analogies within briefs.  The examples show a failure of the 
attorney to connect both sets of facts that the attorney is explicitly 
comparing.  A case-based analogy should start with a fact-to-fact 
comparison.219  Often, attorneys compare things that are not actually facts 
and thus omit this first step.  However, the examples above assume that the 
attorney followed up with subsequent explanation of how the facts lead to 
the suggested outcome: the relational connection.  That part is omitted from 
the above examples because they were only intended to highlight ways in 
which attorneys fail to make factual comparisons.  In reality, attorneys often 
fail to effectively complete that second part of the analogy.  The below 
examples highlight the part of the analogy that focuses on relational 
explanations. 
B. Comparing Relational Similarities 
Below are three examples demonstrating how much stronger an analogy 
is when the writer explicitly explains the relational similarities between the 
precedent case and the present case.   
                                                                                                                          
218 See Hunter, supra note 3, at 153, 155. 
219 See EDWARDS, supra note 86, at 106. 
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1. Example #1 




The Harmon case is analogous to our client’s case with 
respect to a private setting.  Like in Harmon, in which the 
sexual assault took place at the back of a dark movie theater, 
in our client’s case the assault took place under the 
bleachers at a basketball game.  Thus, the assault under the 
bleachers occurred in a private setting.   
 
Version 2: 
The Harmon case is analogous to our client’s case with 
respect to a private setting.  Like in Harmon, in which the 
sexual assault took place at the back of a dark movie theater, 
in our client’s case the assault took place under the 
bleachers at a basketball game.  Despite that the movie 
theater had ten other people in it, the victim was in the back 
and everyone else was looking at the screen.  Similarly, an 
assault under basketball bleachers, during a game, is out of 
the view of everyone else in the gym because the spectators 
are looking at the basketball court, not under the bleachers.  
Even though the assaults occurred in public places, they 
both occurred at a place within the building where nobody 
would be looking.  Thus, the assault under the bleachers 
occurred in a private setting. 
 
Both versions successfully accomplish the first part of an analogy by 
stating an explicit fact-to-fact comparison.220  However, that is where the 
first version stops.  Unfortunately, that is common in legal briefs, especially 
when the attorney explains the case before providing the analogy.  Attorneys 
often state the surface level, factual comparison and assume the reader will 
automatically see the relational similarity.  In other words, the attorney 
seems to assume that the reader will automatically transfer the reasoning 
from the precedent case to the present case and understand how that 
reasoning applies to the facts in the present case.  This may occur if the 
important facts in the precedent case are identical to the facts in the present 
                                                                                                                          
220 See id. at 106. 
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case.  However, it is a dangerous assumption when the facts are not identical.  
Keep in mind, as discussed in Part II, people are more apt to identify surface 
similarities than relational similarities, especially if the reader is busy, 
distracted, or reading quickly.221   
It is possible that some attorneys assume the reader will make these 
relational connections.  However, it is likely that readers, at times, do not.  
Further, it is also possible that a judge (i.e., an expert) looks for the relational 
connection but identifies something other than what the attorney was 
intending.  The relational connection the judge realizes may be a weaker 
connection than what the attorney had presumed but failed to express.  Even 
worse, the relational connection that first enters the judge’s mind may hurt 
the analogy rather than explain it.  The judge may spot something about the 
facts that would support opposing outcomes.  If the attorney does not fill in 
this gap, the attorney loses control of the analogy and is placed at the mercy 
of a reader who is naturally skeptical because she knows the attorney’s job 
is to persuade her.  The attorney must control the analogy by expressing both 
the surface-level, factual comparisons followed by the relational-level 
explanation, i.e., why the same reasoning applies to both sets of facts.   
Only by doing so can the attorney ensure the reader perceives the 
similarities in the same way as the attorney.  The second version executes 
this.  The second version begins with an explicit fact-to-fact comparison and 
then follows with a step-by-step explanation of why those facts are similar, 
why they are important, and why both sets of facts lead to the same outcome.  
The second example is more persuasive because it proves the cases are 
analogous at both the surface and the relational levels.  The attorney drafting 
the second version increases the odds that the reader will see the two cases 
in the same light that the attorney does (or at least that the attorney wants the 
reader to).  It is a more thorough, complete, accurate, and persuasive 
analogy.  By explicitly stating the surface similarities and walking through 
an explanation of the relational similarity, the attorney controls the analogy 
and leaves nothing to chance.   
 
2. Example #2 
 
Version 1: 
The Smith case is analogous to the present case with 
respect to the robber being “armed.”  In Smith, the robber 
held a loaded gun.  In the present case, the robber held a 
                                                                                                                          
221 See Spellman, supra note 11, at 151–52; supra Part III. 
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five-foot long board.  Thus, the robber was armed when 
holding a board.   
 
Version 2: 
The Smith case is analogous to the present case with 
respect to the robber being “armed.”  In Smith, the robber 
held a loaded gun.  In the present case, the robber held a 
five-foot long board.  A robber with a gun is “armed” 
because the robber can use the gun to injure and overpower 
a victim.  Similarly, a robber could use a board to break a 
victim’s bones or knock a victim unconscious with one 
blow.  Both a board and a gun give a robber a decisive 
advantage over the victim in any physical altercation.  Both 
allow a robber to injure a victim at a distance from which 
the victim could not touch the robber.  Because both a board 
and a gun provide a tool that a robber can use to overpower 
a victim’s potential resistance, a robber who possesses a 
board is “armed.” 
 
When comparing the two cases, neither the surface similarities nor the 
relational similarities are patently obvious.  In Version 1, the attorney did a 
good job of comparing facts but stopped short by immediately jumping to 
the conclusion.  In Version 2, however, the attorney provided an explicit 
explanation of the relational similarity.  Thus, Version 2 presents a more 
complete and persuasive analogy.   
In both versions, the attorney properly lays the foundation for the 
analogy by making sure the reader focuses on the analogical facts that the 
attorney will attempt to connect.  Nevertheless, plenty of characteristics 
about a gun separate it from a board.  The attorney does not leave it to the 
reader to self-identify the favorable relational similarities, and the attorney 
helps focus the reader on relational similarities instead of possible 
differences (such as that the gun can shoot bullets from a distance while a 
board cannot shoot bullets and requires that the user, in large part, be able to 
overpower the victim with the user’s own strength).   
3. Example #3 
In this third example, below, the attorney compares the present case to 
Olsen, a precedent case in which the court held that a seasonal cabin was not 
a dwelling because fuses and bathroom fixtures had been removed, 
indicating that the cabin was not ready for immediate habitation. In the 
present case, the seasonal cabin had no electricity or running water.  The 
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surface similarities are obvious: no electricity or running water available in 
either cabin.  Thus, the Olsen case controls, the analogy works, and the court 
in the present case should also conclude that the cabin is not a dwelling, 
right?   
Wrong.  This example demonstrates the value of being able to focus on 
and explain the importance of the facts, why the facts matter, and the 
relational significance.  However, in this last example, the attorney draws a 
distinction.  A case-based distinction is the same as an analogy, except it 
attempts to prove that two cases are different, not similar, 222 and thus the 
judge should reach opposite outcomes in each (or at least the judge is not 
required by stare decisis to reach the same outcome).  In form and structure, 
it is the same as an analogy.223  It is a comparison of two cases (i.e., a source, 
precedent case; and a target, present case).224  The attorney articulates which 
facts from each case she is comparing.225  Then, the attorney explains why 
the facts are different, and most importantly, what it is about the facts that 
should lead to opposite outcomes.226  It is both the opposite of an analogy 
(because it supports opposite outcomes instead of the same outcome) and 
the same as an analogy (because it compares two cases, extracts and 
compares significant facts, and explains the relational comparison to support 
the conclusion).227  The example is provided below:  
Olsen is distinguishable from the present case with 
respect to maintenance for immediate occupancy.  The 
homeowners in Olsen removed the fuses and disconnected 
the bathroom fixtures.  Wilhelm’s cabin, on the other hand, 
has never been connected to water or electricity.  An owner 
that has removed fuses and disconnected water has taken 
active steps to disable the utilities.  Such an owner has 
voluntarily left the premises unsuitable for occupancy.  
However, an owner of a building that has never had running 
water or electricity has not made this choice.  This owner 
has decided that utilities are unnecessary for his use of the 
cabin.  The cabin remains in the same condition when he is 
absent as when he is present.  Wilhelm’s cabin is a dwelling 
                                                                                                                          
222 See Volokh, supra note 89. 
223 See id. 
224 See id. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. 
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because he has not taken active steps to leave his cabin 
unsuitable for occupancy. 
As you can see, the facts on their face seem similar.  In both cases, 
neither cabin had working electricity or running water at the time of the 
break in.  However, the importance (and effect) of those facts differs.  In 
Olsen, those facts meant that the owners could not immediately occupy the 
cabin.  But, in the present case, those similar facts do not affect whether the 
owners could immediately occupy their cabin.  By explaining the relational 
differences, the attorney is able to overcome the surface similarities and 
prove that the cases are very different.  It is the “thing about the facts”—the 
reasons why they do or do not satisfy the rule—that is more important than 
the bare facts.  And, it is crucial to explain that relational aspect.  The hurried 
reader or the novice attorney may spot the similar facts and immediately 
conclude the cases are similar.  Only by refocusing the reader on the 
relational differences can the attorney overcome the reader’s initial 
impression.   
C. Comparing Groups of Facts 
Another common mistake attorneys make when drafting an analogy is 
to compare a group of facts from the precedent case to a group of facts from 
the present case.  Such an analogy may look like this example (presented as 
a distinction), in which the attorney is trying to persuade the court to find 
that a police officer “stopped” the defendant, meaning the defendant 
reasonably believed he could not leave:228  
 
Version 1: 
The State may attempt to argue that facts in this case are 
analogous to those in Maxwell.  However, the situations are 
dramatically different.  The officers in Maxwell approached 
the man, whom they had dealt with before concerning 
previous crimes, during the middle of the day in a crowded 
restaurant and stood at the side of his table.  After 
approaching him and speaking to him, the officers shined a 
flashlight on his hands.  In the present case, Officer Bartlett 
approached Anderson at 4 a.m. on a desolate street and 
initiated the contact with Anderson by shining his flashlight 
into Anderson’s trunk.  Officer Bartlett then stood just a 
couple feet in front of Anderson, with Anderson’s back 
                                                                                                                          
228 See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1991) (quoting United States 
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). 
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against his car’s trunk.  Also, Officer Bartlett’s previous 
interactions with Anderson had always been as friendly 
neighbors.  Maxwell is distinguishable because while a 
person may feel free to leave if an officer stands by his table 
midday, a person would feel less free to leave if an officer 
stands less than five feet from the person, with the person’s 
back against a car, at night.  Therefore, in evaluating the 
totality of the circumstances and what a reasonable person 
would believe, the Court should find that the encounter 
between Bartlett and Anderson was a stop. 
 
In this comparison, the writer grouped the important facts from Maxwell 
together and compared the group to a group of facts from the present case.  
This approach can be appropriate where each fact is unimportant on its own 
but is significant in conjunction with the others.  But, if each fact has its own 
independent significance, then the writer should work through the 
comparisons one fact at a time. 
 The table below demonstrates this visually.  In the table, A, B, C, and 
D represent the significant facts from the precedent case, and 1, 2, 3, and 4 
represent the comparable, significant facts from the present case. 
 
Table 1 
Proper analogy format when 
facts from each case are not 
important alone, but instead are 
important only when combined 
with others 
Proper format when facts have 
their own independent 
significance 
 
Precedent                       Present 
A                                   1 
B                                   2 
C                                   3 
D                                   4 
 
 
Precedent                       Present 
A                                     1 
B                                     2 
C                                     3 
D                                     4 
 
The distinction between the Maxwell case and the present case in the 
example above follows the format in the left column of the table.  The writer 
grouped all the significant facts together from Maxwell and then listed all 
the similar facts from the present case.  However, each fact was important 
for different reasons; thus, each fact would have been significant toward the 
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outcome, even without the other facts.  By grouping them, however, the 
writer loses the opportunity to explain the significance of each fact and to 
emphatically or persuasively highlight the differences between the two 
cases.  Returning to Version 1, the reader did attempt to follow the 
comparison of the surface differences by explaining the relational 
difference.  But, because the writer grouped the facts together, the writer is 
not able to flesh out the relational component as significantly.229  Either the 
writer overlooked some of the relational significance, or the writer was not 
able to articulate it because the focus was no longer on specific facts, thus 
significantly diluting the explanation of the relational significance. 
In Version 2 below, the writer works through the comparisons one fact 
at a time instead of grouping all of the important facts from each case 
together.  Notice how this emphasizes the differences by allowing the reader 
to more easily see the many differences.  Unfortunately, the writer still did 
not flesh out the relational significance effectively.  But, by working through 
the facts one at a time, the number of structural differences is more apparent, 
and the odds of the reader self-identifying relational differences increases. 
    
Version 2: 
The State may attempt to argue that facts in this case are 
analogous to those in Maxwell.  However, the situations are 
dramatically different.  First, the officers in Maxwell 
approached the man during the middle of the day in a 
crowded restaurant.  Officer Bartlett, on the other hand 
approached Anderson at 4 a.m. on a desolate street.  Second, 
whereas the officer in Maxwell stood to the side of the table, 
Officer Bartlett stood only a few feet in front of Anderson, 
with Anderson’s back up against the trunk of his car.  Third, 
the officers in Maxwell had dealt with the man before 
concerning his previous crimes.  Officer Bartlett’s previous 
interactions with Anderson had always been as friendly 
neighbors.  Fourth, the officers in Maxwell, who were inside 
a lit restaurant, shined a flashlight on the man’s hands after 
the encounter had commenced.  Officer Bartlett, on the 
other hand, shined the light on the trunk when he initiated 
his contact with Anderson.  In evaluating the totality of the 
circumstances and what a reasonable person would believe, 
                                                                                                                          
229 It could still be possible for the writer to flesh out the relational differences, but when 
writers group facts together, they often fail to fully flesh out all of the relational differences.   
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the Court should find that the encounter between Officer 
Bartlett and Anderson was a stop.    
 
The persuasive value of the comparison between the two cases is still 
strongly limited because the writer failed to explain the relational 
differences.  However, the comparison is an improvement over Version 1 
because, if nothing else, the reader can easily see how many factual 
differences there are, and exactly what the factual differences are, between 
the two cases.  In Version 3, below, the writer improves the analogy even 
more by explaining the relational significance of each factual difference.  
 
Version 3: 
The State may attempt to argue that facts in this case are 
analogous to those in Maxwell.  However, the situations are 
dramatically different.  First, the officers in Maxwell 
approached the man during the middle of the day in a 
crowded restaurant.  Officer Bartlett, on the other hand 
approached Anderson at 4 a.m. on a desolate street.  A 
person is much more likely to be intimidated when 
approached by someone in the dark on an empty street than 
when approached in the afternoon with people all around.  
When a person feels intimidated by an officer, the person 
would feel more scared to leave.  Second, whereas the 
officer in Maxwell stood to the side of the table, Officer 
Bartlett stood only a few feet in front of Anderson, with 
Anderson’s back up against the trunk of his car.  In 
Maxwell, the defendant could have easily stood up and left.  
Anderson, on the other hand, would have felt “pinned” 
between Bartlett and his car.  Third, the officers in Maxwell 
had dealt with the man before concerning his previous 
crimes.  Officer Bartlett’s previous interactions with 
Anderson had always been as friendly neighbors.  Thus, it 
would be alarming for Anderson to have Bartlett now 
questioning him, telling him he was suspicious, saying, 
“Don’t BS me,” and asking what was in his bag.  Because 
this is different from their prior encounters, Anderson 
would feel that Bartlett was acting as an investigating cop, 
not a friendly neighbor.  Fourth, the officers in Maxwell, 
who were inside a lit restaurant, shined a flashlight on the 
man’s hands after the encounter had commenced.  Officer 
Bartlett, on the other hand, shined the light in the trunk 
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when he initiated his contact with Anderson.  Because 
Bartlett shined his light in the trunk, it would have been 
obvious to Anderson that Bartlett suspected Anderson 
might have something illegal in the trunk.  A person would 
feel obligated to stay if the person knows an officer suspects 
that the person has committed a crime.  In evaluating the 
totality of the circumstances and what a reasonable person 
would believe, the Court should find that the encounter 
between Officer Bartlett and Anderson was a stop.   
   
This version is the most effective because the reader can easily see what 
the important factual comparisons are and why each of those factual 
differences matter.  The writer has mapped the factual differences in the 
easiest way for the reader to follow.  This has helped highlight each fact 
individually.  In addition, the writer has explained the relational component 
of each comparison.230  Thus, the comparison mirrors the second column of 
the table:  
 
Table 2 
Improper analogy format when 
facts have their own independent 
significance. 
Proper format when facts have 
their own independent 
significance 
 
Precedent                       Present 
A                                   1 
B                                   2 
C                                   3 
D                                   4 
 
Explanation of significance, if it 
exists at all, is typically less 
focused or missing some points 
when it follows a group of facts 
compared to a group of facts. 
 
 
Precedent                       Present 
A                                     1 
Explanation of significance 
B                                     2 
Explanation of significance 
C                                     3 
Explanation of significance 
D                                     4 
Explanation of significance 
                                                                                                                          
230 If this were an analogy, the writer would have explained why each fact was similar.  
See Volokh, supra note 89.  Because this was a distinction, the writer explained why there 
are not relational similarities between the two cases, and thus why the court in the present 
case need not follow the precedent set in the prior case.  See id. 
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When cases have several facts to compare, writers often fall short of 
squeezing the most benefit out of their comparisons when they compare the 
facts from each case as groups of facts.  By instead working through each 
fact individually, the writer can better present the comparison in the way that 
will be most effective for the reader.  The writer can pinpoint and highlight 
every surface attribute the writer wants the judge to consider.  When the 
writer instead groups facts together, the writer runs the risk that the judge 
may focus on certain facts and overlook others.  
Once the writer isolates each surface attribute, the writer can then more 
explicitly explain the relational connections in a more effective, thorough, 
and persuasive way.  As Version 2 likely demonstrates, without this explicit 
explanation, the reader may not self-identify what it is about the facts that 
matter.  Why is shining a light in a trunk different than shining a light on a 
person’s hands?  A hurried, distracted, or tired reader may not stop and think 
about why those situations are different.  The writer must take this step to 
maximize the value of the comparison.  In Version 3, the writer has 
completed the comparison by explaining the significance of each fact.  The 
reader may agree or disagree with the explanation.  But, at least the 
explanation enters the reader’s mind, which studies demonstrate might 
otherwise never occur.231  By explicitly stating the relational significance, 
the reader makes the comparison much more persuasive to a judge, who will 
be more persuaded by the relational component of the comparison than the 
factual, superficial component. 
V. CONCLUSION      
Studies in various disciplines have explained how readers process 
information delivered in analogical format.232  By considering the results 
from those studies and applying that information to the world of legal 
writing, attorneys can greatly improve the persuasiveness of the analogies in 
their briefs.  The results of those studies indicate that attorneys writing legal 
briefs (especially busy or novice attorneys) may fail to find and select the 
most helpful cases, properly set up their analogies, recognize and focus on 
the most important information, and format their comparisons effectively.233  
When this happens, the analogies have less influence on the judge than 
the attorney expects.  This shortcoming is important given the central role 
that stare decisis, and thus case-based analogies, play in legal advocacy.  
When an attorney begins to tackle research and writing with a fuller 
                                                                                                                          
231 See Markman & Gentner, supra note 149, at 431; Chi et al., supra note 177, at 130. 
232 See Markman & Gentner, supra note 149, at 431; Chi et al., supra note 177, at 130. 
233 See Markman & Gentner, supra note 149, at 431; Chi et al., supra note 177, at 130. 
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understanding of analogies and implements the advice given in this Article, 
the attorney will quickly become a more effective—and potentially an 
expert—advocate for his client.   
 
